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Case CaptionCase No.Topics and IssuesAuthorCitation / CountyDecidedPostedWebCite
State v. Lewis C-160909SEX OFFENSES - CLASSIFICATION - REGISTRATION - NOTIFICATION: Where the trial court correctly classified defendant as a Tier I sex offender under the Adam Walsh Act, but provided defendant with incorrect notice of his registration requirements, the remedy is to remand the cause for the court to correctly notify defendant of his Tier I registration and verification duties and their duration.MillerHamilton 4/13/2018 4/13/2018 2018-Ohio-1380
In re K.T. C-170667, C-170687, C-170701, C-170702, C-170707CHILDREN - CUSTODY - BEST INTEREST: The trial court erred by failing to consider the factors set forth in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(e) when determining whether the grant of permanent custody of four children to HCJFS was in each child's best interest.CunninghamHamilton 4/13/2018 4/13/2018 2018-Ohio-1381
State v. Littlepage C-160918POSTCONVICTION-DNA TESTING: The common pleas court did not err in denying defendant's 2016 application under R.C. 2953.71 et seq. for DNA testing regarding his aggravated-murder offense, because his guilty plea to that offense excluded him from eligibility to request that testing. R.C. 2953.72(C)(2) and 2953.71(F).Per CuriamHamilton 4/13/2018 4/13/2018 2018-Ohio-1382
Murphy Elevator Co., Inc. v. 11320 Chester L.L.C. C-170251CONTRACTS - DAMAGES: Where the parties' elevator-maintenance contract clearly and unambiguously provided that defendant would be responsible for paying the difference between plaintiff's regular and overtime billing rates if it requested that plaintiff perform services outside of the contractually specified dates and times, the trial court did not err in accepting testimony from plaintiff as to the amount plaintiff charged for regular and overtime services in a given year, or in awarding damages accordingly. Where the contract did not specify the hourly rate that defendant would be required to pay plaintiff for performing requested services that were not covered under the contract, the trial court did not err in awarding plaintiff damages for the services in the amount of plaintiff's standard rates. The trial court erred in awarding plaintiff the gross revenue that it would have received under the second year of the parties' contract where plaintiff stopped performing contractual services due to defendant's nonpayment; the court should have awarded plaintiff its lost profits.MyersHamilton 4/11/2018 4/11/2018 2018-Ohio-1362
State v. Robinson C-170473DRUGS - EVIDENCE - PLEAS: Where defendant entered a no-contest plea to possessing drug-abuse instruments under R.C. 2925.12, which applies only where the instrument involved is a hypodermic or syringe, and the state's explanation of the circumstances showed that defendant possessed a crack pipe, the state failed to establish all of the elements of the offense, and the trial court erred in finding defendant guilty of possessing drug-abuse instruments.DetersHamilton 4/6/2018 4/6/2018 2018-Ohio-1315
State v. Wallace C-160788POSTCONVICTION-JURISDICTION-ALLIED OFFENSES-INEFFECTIVE COUNSEL-POSTRELEASE CONTROL: Defendant's postconviction allied-offenses and ineffective-counsel claims were subject to dismissal for lack of jurisdiction: the claims were reviewable under R.C. 2953.21 et seq., governing the proceedings on a petition for postconviction relief, because they sought relief based on alleged constitutional violations during the proceedings leading to defendant's convictions, R.C. 2953.21(A)(1); but the postconviction statutes did not confer jurisdiction to entertain those claims, because they did not satisfy R.C. 2953.21(A)(2)'s time restrictions or R.C. 2953.23's jurisdictional requirements for entertaining a late postconviction claim; and the claims, even if demonstrated, would not have rendered the convictions void. The common pleas court erred in failing to correct that part of defendant's aggravated-robbery sentence that was void because it was not imposed in conformity with the statutory mandates concerning postrelease control: the postrelease-control notification provided at sentencing, that defendant was subject to postrelease-control supervision for "up to five years," did not adequately inform him that postrelease control was for a mandatory five-year period; and the language included in the judgment of conviction stating that he was "subject to the post release [sic] control supervision * * * of R.C. 2967.28" was inadequate to inform him of the duration or mandatory nature of his postrelease control.Per CuriamHamilton 3/28/2018 3/28/2018 2018-Ohio-1129
State v. Jones C-160826AGGRAVATED ROBBERY - WEAPONS - FIREARM - EVIDENCE - WITNESSES - PROSECUTOR - COUNSEL - HEARSAY: Where a witness was cooperative until days before trial, the state was not required to follow the procedures set forth in R.C. 2939.26 before the trial court could find that the state had used reasonable efforts to secure the witness's appearance and declare the witness unavailable. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it found that the state had used reasonable efforts to secure a witness's appearance before declaring that witness unavailable where officers had tried to contact the witness through different phone numbers, social media, and her mother, and the witness no longer lived at her last known address. Although using analogies to attempt to explain reasonable doubt is discouraged, the prosecutor's comparison of reasonable doubt to putting together a jigsaw puzzle did not prejudice defendant where the trial court properly instructed the jury on reasonable doubt. Defendant was not prejudiced by trial counsel's failure to offer to stipulate to his prior conviction, which constituted an element of the charge of having a weapon while under a disability, where the failure to offer to stipulate did not change the outcome of the trial. Testimony of a police officer about speaking to third parties did not violate the prohibition in State v. Ricks, 136 Ohio St.3d 256, 2013-Ohio-3712, 995 N.E.2d 1181, where the officer never testified to what the third parties actually told him. The evidence presented by the state, including that defendant had pointed a firearm at the cashier and demanded money, implying that he would shoot the cashier if the cashier failed to comply with his demand, was sufficient to show that the firearm was operable. For purposes of defendant's aggravated-robbery conviction, the cashier of the store defendant robbed was the "owner" of the money in the cash register and the store's inventory.MockHamilton 3/28/2018 3/28/2018 2018-Ohio-1130
State v. Carberry C-170095JUVENILE - BIND OVER - PROCEDURE/RULES - SEX OFFENSES - CONSTITUTIONAL LAW/CRIMINAL - COUNSEL - JAIL-TIME CREDIT: The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in transferring defendant's three gross-sexual-imposition cases to the common pleas court, and trial counsel was not ineffective in that regard, where the juvenile court ordered a mental evaluation pursuant to Juv.R. 30, held a hearing, discussed on the record the factors weighing in favor of transferring jurisdiction, and recorded the factors on a worksheet attached to the entry transferring jurisdiction: the juvenile court complied with all the requirements for discretionary transfer, and the court's amenability determination was supported by the record and evinced a sound reasoning process. The common pleas court did not violate defendant's constitutional right to due process or right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment by classifying him as a Tier II sex offender under R.C. Chapter 2950 after defendant had pleaded guilty to gross sexual imposition, and trial counsel was not ineffective in that regard: once defendant had been properly bound over to the adult court, his classification under the adult sex-offender-classification scheme did not violate his constitutional rights. The cause must be remanded, when the trial court did not, as required by R.C. 2967.19(B)(1)(g)(i) and 2967.191, determine and include in the sentencing entry the proper amount of jail-time credit to which defendant is entitled.CunninghamHamilton 3/23/2018 3/23/2018 2018-Ohio-1060
State v. Martin C-0117, 126, 135IDENTIFICATION - ATTEMPTED MURDER - TAMPERING WITH EVIDENCE - EVIDENCE - CONSTITUTIONAL LAW/CRIMINAL - COUNSEL - PROSECUTOR - SENTENCING: Three witnesses' identifications of defendant during one-person arrest-scene show-ups were reliable under the totality of the circumstances where they had a good opportunity to view defendant during the commission of the crimes, they provided consistent and thorough descriptions of him to the police and to the 911 operator, they were certain of their identifications at the time, and they identified the defendant within 30 minutes after the crimes. R.C. 2933.83 is limited to live lineups. Defendant's convictions for attempted murder and tampering with the evidence were supported by sufficient evidence and were not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence where the state presented testimony from three eyewitnesses who had seen defendant attack an unarmed man with a butcher knife cutting him on the head, face, and torso; one of those eyewitnesses followed defendant, alerting police to his whereabouts, and watched as the police took him into custody; and the police immediately recovered the knife used in the attack hidden underneath a vehicle near where defendant had been taken into custody. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion for a mistrial based on prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument, because the prosecutor merely responded to defense counsel's arguments and did not improperly shift the burden of proof to defendant. Defendant's claims that his two trial attorneys had rendered ineffective assistance by failing to adequately prepare for trial and failing to seek a continuance to determine whether he wanted to testify were not supported by the record where defendant had indicated his confidence in his attorneys' representation, and the record shows that defendant's failure to testify was the result of his own knowing and intelligent decision. The trial court's imposition of consecutive sentences was not contrary to law where the trial court orally stated at the sentencing hearing and journalized in the sentencing entry the findings required by R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), and the record supported those findings.DetersHamilton 3/23/2018 3/23/2018 2018-Ohio-1061
Blue Ash v. Price C-170347APPELLATE REVIEW/CRIMINAL - CONSTITUTIONAL LAW/CRIMINAL: Where the trial court found defendant not guilty of a violation of a traffic ordinance after a criminal trial, the court of appeals has discretionary authority under R.C. 2945.67(A) and App.R. 5(C) to review substantive legal rulings made in the criminal case, so long as the verdict itself is not appealed. The trial court erred in determining that a municipal ordinance prohibiting toy vehicles in streets violated defendant's constitutional right to travel: although a citizen has a fundamental right to intrastate travel, an ordinance which burdens a single mode of transportation, here toy vehicles, does not implicate the right to travel. The trial court erred in determining that a municipal ordinance prohibiting toy vehicles in streets was void for vagueness as applied to defendant's conduct in riding a motorized skateboard: although the toy-vehicle ordinance does not specifically mention motorized skateboards among the prohibited modes of transportation on streets, nothing in the ordinance suggests that the prohibition is limited to human-powered modes of transportation, and because the ordinance prohibits riding a "skateboard" in the street, a motorized skateboard could be considered a "skateboard" or a "similar device."Deters  3/23/2018 3/23/2018 2018-Ohio-1062
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