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Case CaptionCase No.Topics and IssuesAuthorCitation / CountyDecidedPostedWebCite
State v. Evans C-160419POSTRELEASE CONTROL - SENTENCING: The trial court did not err in imposing postrelease control on defendant for the offenses of having a weapon while under a disability and carrying a concealed weapon where defendant had not served the prison terms for those offenses. Where the sentencing entry failed to explicitly set forth the sequence in which defendant's consecutive sentences were to be served, Ohio Adm.Code 5120-2-03.1(M) is instructive in determining that defendant was required to first serve the three-year mandatory prison term for the firearm specification, followed by the 15-year mandatory prison term for murder, then the aggregate of the nonmandatory terms for the weapon-under-disability and concealed-weapon offenses, and finally, the aggregate of the nonmandatory portion of the life term. [See SEPARATE CONCURRENCE: Where the order of the consecutive sentences imposed by the trial court in the sentencing entry aligns with the order set forth in Ohio Adm.Code 5120-2-03.1(M), it is unnecessary to decide which controls for the purpose of determining whether postrelease control was timely imposed upon defendant.]MyersHamilton 5/12/2017 5/12/2017 2017-Ohio-2767
Henzerling v. Environmental Ents., Inc. C-160232EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE - INTENTIONAL TORT - R.C. 2745.01 - SUMMARY JUDGMENT: The trial court did not err in granting defendant employer's motion for summary judgment in an intentional-tort case brought by its employee's estate: R.C. 2745.01(C)'s rebuttable presumption did not apply because the employer's failure to require the employee to use a submersion tank before cutting away metal casings on air filters was not tantamount to the deliberate removal of an equipment safety guard where the submersion tank was not an equipment safety guard, and there was otherwise no issue of fact as to whether the employer had deliberately intended to harm its employee.Per CuriamHamilton 5/5/2017 5/5/2017 2017-Ohio-2666
State v. Wright C-150715JURIES - HEARSAY - OTHER ACTS - IMPEACHMENT - WITNESS - PROSECUTOR - COUNSEL - SENTENCING: The trial court did not err in overruling the defendant's objection to the state's use of a peremptory challenge to exclude an African-American juror where the trial court's acceptance of the state's race-neutral reason based on the cumulative effect of several factors was not clearly erroneous. The trial court did not err in finding that a witness was unavailable even though the state failed to submit sworn testimony about its efforts to locate the witness, because the defendant forfeited the issue where he did not object on the basis that sworn testimony was required and did not dispute what the prosecutor had said about the state's attempts to locate the witness. The trial court did not err in finding that a witness was unavailable where the record showed that even though the witness had been present during the trial, he had left the courthouse, could not be located, and was "on the run," actively trying to avoid testifying. The trial court did not err in allowing the state to read an unavailable witness's testimony from a previous trial to the jury, because the testimony fell under the hearsay exception in Evid.R. 804(B)(1) where it came from an adversarial proceeding and the defendant had had an opportunity and motive at that proceeding to develop the testimony by direct, cross and redirect examination. The trial court did not err in allowing an unavailable witness's statement to police to be read to the jury under the hearsay exception for recorded recollection in Evid.R. 803(5) where the witness had repeatedly testified in a prior trial that he did not remember the events in question, but he had acknowledged making the statement to the police when his knowledge was fresh and had denied lying to the police. The trial court erred in allowing hearsay statements by the murder victim into evidence under the exception in Evid.R. 803(1) for present sense impressions, because the record did not establish a context for the victim's statements or the event or condition that prompted his statements. The trial court did not err in allowing a police detective to testify to hearsay statements made by two witnesses to the effect that the defendant had admitted to murdering the victim, because those statements were consistent with the witnesses' testimony in a previous trial and were used to rebut the defendant's claim that the witnesses lied to receive favorable treatment. The trial court did not err in admitting evidence of the defendant's other bad acts where that testimony was necessary to show the relationship between the defendant, the victim and the various witnesses, and to show the defendant's motive for killing the victim. The trial court erred in allowing the state to impeach its own witnesses because a neutral answer such as "I don't remember" does not constitute affirmative damage. The record did not demonstrate that any alleged misconduct by the prosecutor was so egregious as to affect the defendant's substantial rights. The defendant failed to demonstrate that his counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness or that but for counsel's errors, the results of the proceeding would have been otherwise; therefore, he failed to meet his burden to show ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court's failure to inform the defendant at sentencing about the requirement that he submit to DNA testing and the consequences of failing to do so under R.C. 2901.07(B) was harmless and did not prejudice the defendant.MockHamilton 4/28/2017 4/28/2017 2017-Ohio-1568
Cincinnati v. PE Alms Hills Realty, L.L.C. C-160459DEBTOR-CREDITOR - RECEIVER: The trial court did not abuse its discretion by appointing a receiver in a third-party commercial foreclosure action. The lender was entitled to a receiver under R.C. 2735.01(A)(3), because the lender presented evidence that the borrower had entered into a contractual assignment of leases and rents.ZayasHamilton 4/28/2017 4/28/2017 2017-Ohio-1569
Cincinnati v. Fourth Natl. Realty, L.L.C. C-160297CONSTITUTIONAL LAW/CIVIL - MUNICIPAL - ZONING - STANDING: The trial court did not err in granting injunctive relief to the city requiring the appellant to remove a sign on its building that is in violation of the off-site sign prohibition provisions in the city's zoning code, where the appellant failed to present a prima facie case of selective enforcement and failed to show that it could keep the oversized off-site sign in place even if the appellant's free-speech-based challenges to the off-site sign provisions were successful. The trial court erred by dismissing for lack of standing the part of the appellant's counterclaim seeking a declaration that the city's off-site sign prohibition provisions are unconstitutional as applied to the appellant's desired legally-sized-off-site sign, and on their face to the extent they restrict noncommercial speech.CunninghamHamilton 4/26/2017 4/26/2017 2017-Ohio-1523
In re M.I. C-160466JUVENILE - SEX OFFENSES - EQUAL PROTECTION: The mandatory classification of 16- and 17-year-old sex offenders under R.C. 2152.83(A) and 2152.84(A)(2)(c) does not violate the Equal Protection Clauses of the United States and Ohio Constitutions, because the juvenile-sex-offender-classification system is rationally related to the legitimate governmental interest of protecting the public from sex offenders.MyersHamilton 4/26/2017 4/26/2017 2017-Ohio-1524
State v. Dardinger C-160467APPELLATE REVIEW - JURISDICTION - POSTCONVICTION - POSTRELEASE CONTROL: The common pleas court had no jurisdiction to entertain defendant's postconviction "Motion to Vacate Postrelease Control" on the grounds that he was not sentenced in conformity with the postrelease-control statutes and that imposing postrelease control denied him the protections of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution: the motion was not reviewable under R.C. 2953.21 et seq. as a postconviction petition, because the postrelease-control claim did not allege a constitutional violation, and the alleged double-jeopardy violation did not occur during the proceedings leading to his conviction; under Crim.R. 33 as a motion for a new trial, when his conviction had followed a guilty plea, not a trial, or under Crim.R. 32.1 as a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, when the motion did not seek withdrawal of the plea; under R.C. Chapter 2731 as a petition for a writ of mandamus, under R.C. Chapter 2721 as a declaratory judgment action, or under R.C. Chapter 2725 as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, because the motion did not satisfy those statutes' procedural requirements; under Civ.R. 60(B), upon the authority of Crim.R. 57(B), because his conviction was reviewable under the procedures provided for a direct appeal; or under a court's jurisdiction to correct a void judgment, because the postrelease-control portion of his sentence was not void. The postrelease-control portion of defendant's sentence was not void, because postrelease control was properly included in his sentence: the postrelease-control notification provided by the trial court at the combined plea-and-sentencing hearing before accepting defendant's guilty plea satisfied the statutory requirement that defendant be notified concerning postrelease control at sentencing; postrelease control was properly incorporated into the judgment of conviction by the nunc pro tunc entry correcting the judgment of conviction to include postrelease control; and the double-jeopardy protection against multiple punishments was not implicated by the adult parole authority's imposition of the five-year mandatory period of postrelease control after defendant had completed his prison term and had mistakenly been told that he would not be on postrelease control, because he had no legitimate expectation in the finality of his sentence when he knew, or should have known, that his sentence was legally incomplete.Per CuriamHamilton 4/26/2017 4/26/2017 2017-Ohio-1525
State v. Ruff C-160385, C-160386SENTENCING: On appeal from a remand for resentencing on allied offenses, defendant's arguments relating to the trial court's failure to make the findings for consecutive sentences, consider the purposes and principles of sentencing in R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12, and notify him pursuant to R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(f) that he cannot ingest or be injected with a drug of abuse and that he is required to submit to random drug testing in prison are not barred by res judicata, because they arose out of his resentencing hearing. The trial court did not err in imposing consecutive sentences where the trial court made the requisite findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) at the sentencing hearing and incorporated those findings into the judgment entries of conviction. The trial court was not required to state on the record that it had considered the R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 factors prior to imposing sentence, and the appellate court can presume from a silent record that the trial court considered the factors prior to imposing sentence unless the defendant affirmatively shows that the court failed to do so. The court's failure to inform the defendant that he cannot ingest or be injected with a drug of abuse while in prison and that he would be required to submit to random drug testing while incarcerated did not prejudice the defendant, because R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(f) conferred no substantive rights upon the defendant, and therefore, the trial court's failure to comply with the statutory provision was harmless error. The cause must be remanded to the trial court for correction of the clerical errors in the judgment entries to reflect that the defendant had been found guilty by a jury and not the trial court.DetersHamilton 4/19/2017 4/19/2017 2017-Ohio-1430
In re M. C-170008CHILDREN - CUSTODY: The juvenile court did not err in awarding permanent custody of a child to the Hamilton County Department of Job and Family Services where the record showed that the child's mother failed to consistently visit the child and continued to have issues with impulse control and substance abuse despite treatment, and where the child had special needs and needed permanence to address her issues, and there were no other relatives who could care for the child. The juvenile court did not err in finding that it was in the best interests of two of mother's other children to grant legal custody to the individuals who were caring for them where the record showed that mother was not in a position to care for the children and they were thriving in their placements.DetersHamilton 4/19/2017 4/19/2017 2017-Ohio-1431
In re W.M. C-170003CHILDREN - CUSTODY: Where the magistrate's finding that mother had failed to remedy the conditions that had led to the removal of her children from her home was supported by competent and credible evidence, the trial court did not err in adopting the magistrate's decision granting permanent custody of the children to the Hamilton County Department of Job and Family Services. Although the reasonable-efforts requirement in R.C. 2151.419 does not apply to an R.C. 2151.413 motion for permanent custody, absent a narrowly defined statutory exception, the state must still make reasonable efforts to reunite the family during the custody proceedings prior to the termination of parental rights.MyersHamilton 4/14/2017 4/14/2017 2017-Ohio-1398